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Abstract
Generally, computational creativity (CC) systems cannot ex-
plain why they are being creative, without ultimately referring
back to the values and goals of their designer. Answering the
“why?” would allow for the attribution of intentional agency,
and likely lead to a stronger perception of creativity. Enactive
artificial intelligence, a framework inspired by autopoietic en-
active cognitive science, equips us with the necessary condi-
tions for a value function to reflect a system’s own intrinsic
goals. We translate the framework’s general claims to CC and
ground a system’s creative activity intrinsically in the main-
tenance of its identity. We relate to candidate computational
principles to realise enactive artificial agents, thus laying the
foundations for a minimal, non-anthropocentric model of in-
tentional creative agency. We discuss first implications for
the design and evaluation of CC, and address why human-
level intentional creative agency is so hard to achieve. We
ultimately propose a new research direction in CC, where in-
tentional creative agency is addressed bottom up.
Introduction
Imagine conducting an interrogation experiment, in which
human participants are to judge the creativity of a state of the
art computational creativity (CC) system. The system could
be a piece of software or consist of one or several embod-
ied agents, it could act in the lab or in the field, and there is
no restriction on the type of creativity exercised. Crucially,
the system has unlimited capacities to enter into a dialogue
and to frame (Charnley, Pease, and Colton, 2012) its actions.
Participants include the general public, CC researchers, as
well as expert practitioners and critics of the type of cre-
ativity exercised. In contrast to the Turing (1950) test, the
system must always answer truthfully.
We would expect most participants to base their judge-
ment on the system’s observed behaviour and produced arte-
facts only. Some might make few inquiries about the sys-
tem’s process, while others might engage in a deep interro-
gation. We would certainly end up with divided opinions on
the creativity of the system, confirming the view that cre-
ativity is an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1955; Jor-
danous and Keller, 2016). While we would expect most par-
ticipants to attribute creativity to the system if its behaviour
and output was novel and valuable, others might be more
inquisitive, and eventually fail the system because it cannot
give satisfactory answers to why it acted the way it did.
This addresses the system’s intentional agency, i.e. its ca-
pacity to have a purpose, goal or directive for creative action
(cf. Ventura, 2016). However, we doubt that any existing CC
system, even with our hypothetical dialogue capacity, could
answer questions about its intentionality without referring to
its designer’s goals. Jordanous and Keller (2016) have em-
pirically identified intentionality as one factor in the percep-
tion of creative systems. We believe that a system’s inability
to account for its own intentionality is a valid reason for peo-
ple to disapprove it of being creative, particularly creative in
its own right. We also doubt that these systems fully own
their artefacts, as they cannot justify why they originated
them. Ada Lovelace famously addressed originality:
“The Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate
anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it
to perform”. (Menabrea and Lovelace, 1842)
By stating that the Analytical Engine has no pretensions
to originate anything, Lovelace gives us the key to what we
believe is the answer to the “why?” in CC: if we want to
design systems that are deemed creative in their own right,
we need them to own their goals. Their pretensions, i.e.
their motivations, must not be the designers’, but arise from
their own, genuine concern. This concern forms the basis
of a system’s sense-making, i.e. the assignment of values
to features of the world that are of relevance to the system
itself. To be considered an intentional agent in its own right,
it must use these values as the basis of action.
Not only do existing implementations fail to address this
ultimate challenge of intentional creative agency – CC also
misses a theoretical framework describing the conditions for
intrinsic goal-ownership underlying intentionality. We be-
lieve that the development of such a framework is hindered
by CC’s focus on human creativity in system design and
evaluation. Human creativity unfolds within a complex net-
work of influences shaped by a person’s social and cultural
environment (Bown, 2015; Jordanous, 2015). Identifying
why a person was being creative and translating the find-
ings to formal models therefore is hard. We also believe
that CC’s focus on big-C artefacts (Kaufman and Beghetto,
2009) is detrimental, as the values within are hard to dis-
entangle and invite complex interpretations of the notion of
creativity. Despite these impediments, CC’s major contribu-
tions to key concepts around intentionality such as adaptivity
(Bown, 2012) and agency (Bown, 2015) are still strictly an-
thropocentric. The concept of creativity is human-made, but
it should not remain human-centric: by understanding how
intentional creative agency can be brought about in artificial
agents, we can identify creativity in systems that previously
remained unnoticed, learn about new forms of creative be-
haviour, and actively support their emergence.
We adopt Froese and Ziemke’s (2009) enactive artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) framework, which provides a non-
anthropocentric account of intentional agency. In contrast to
Dennett’s (1989) intentional stance which could be applied
to any system, Froese and Ziemke (2009) limit intentionality
to systems that share some essential characteristics with liv-
ing organisms. Based on the bio-systemic foundations of au-
topoietic enactive cognitive science, they argue that the pur-
pose of an intentional agent, determining its intrinsic goals,
is the maintenance of its existence. They propose two con-
ditions for intentional agency and sense-making in artificial
agents: constitutive autonomy and adaptivity.
We argue that adaptive and constitutively autonomous
agents must necessarily exhibit behaviour which many
would deem creative. More specifically, we claim that two
forms of creativity, autopoietic- and adaptive creativity, are
intrinsic to enactive artificial agents. We hypothesise how
our minimal model could give rise to more complex forms of
creative behaviour, and briefly outline computational princi-
ples to put our theoretical considerations into practice. We
thus extend Froese and Ziemke’s (2009) framework with
an account for creativity to establish a non-anthropocentric,
minimal model of intentional creative agency. Our findings
suggest that creativity can be found in any living being, not
only in humans and highly developed animals. We discuss
first implications of our enactive account for the perception
of creativity in nature, for CC evaluation, and for building
artificial agents with human-level creativity.
Our model is non-anthropocentric but agent-centric, look-
ing at the value of actions and artefacts from the perspec-
tive of the creative agent, in contrast to an external observer.
It is minimal in that we account for intentional agency in
p-creative behaviour (Boden, 2003) at the edge of being,
in contrast to big-C, h-creativity shaped in a social context
(Saunders and Bown, 2015). Accepting creativity as essen-
tially contested, we encourage notions of creativity without
or with externally attributed values; by identifying what is
required for intentional creative agency, we do not constrain,
but widen the scope of what should be considered creative.
Our ultimate goal is to propose a new direction for re-
search in CC, in which intentional creative agency is ad-
dressed from the bottom up. We motivate our approach by
asking the “why?” for existing CC systems with a focus on
big-C creativity. However, we do not address how this ques-
tion could be answered in terms of communication and fram-
ing (Charnley, Pease, and Colton, 2012). While we put for-
ward a hypothesis about climbing up the creativity ladder,
closing the explanatory gap between our model and human-
level, big-C creativity is subject to further research and ex-
perimentation. We agree with Froese and Ziemke (2009)
that their conditions are necessary for intentional agency, but
also share their caution that they might not be sufficient.
Climbing Down the Creativity Ladder
Traditionally, much research in CC is software-based and
models complex human-level creativity in artistic domains.
We show by means of case-studies and by reference to tradi-
tional AI arguments that this symbolic approach cannot pos-
sibly account for intrinsic goal-ownership. Embracing the
paradigm of embodied and situated cognition reduces this
challenge, but is still insufficient. Our solution eventually
leads us away from human, big-C artefacts down to creative
behaviour in minimal agents with a precarious existence.
Symbolic Computational Creativity
Developed for more than a decade, The Painting Fool (TPF)
is a prime example of a symbolic CC system. The project’s
goal is to create a system which is eventually taken seriously
as a creative artist in its own right (Colton, 2012). TPF was
used extensively in field studies about the perception of cre-
ativity by unbiased observers. In the “You Can’t Know my
Mind” exhibition (Colton and Ventura, 2014), the software
accompanied its portraits with a commentary on their cre-
ation, enabling visitors to project intentionality on the sys-
tem. We use this context for a case-study in which TPF is
equipped with our hypothetical dialogue system.
Being asked “Why did you paint my portrait in that way?”,
TPF could genuinely answer: “Because I was reading the
following newspaper article, and this was used to simulate
a mood which drove the artistic choices I made”. Digging
deeper, the next question could be: “Why were you reading
the newspaper?”. The answer to this would be: “Because
my programmer told to me to do so”. A particularly curious
participant might then ask: “Why did your programmer tell
you to read the newspaper?”, to which the system would re-
spond: “So that I have an interesting backstory for my cre-
ative acts”. Asked “Why do you need such a backstory?”,
the system’s honest answer would be “So that I appear more
creative”. We see that our persistent questioning yields a cir-
cularity with the reason behind certain behaviours being to
promote the appearance of creativity. It is fair to say that
TPF was given the ability to sustain the impression of inten-
tionality at only the first level.
Cook and Colton (2015) account for successful answers
one level below. To overcome randomness and hard-coding,
they introduce a method to invent distinct, but consistent and
therefore believable preferences. Being asked why it painted
a portrait in a certain tone, TPF could truthfully explain its
behaviour through a set of initially generated colour prefer-
ences residing within the system. However, asking why it
came up with a certain set of preferences, or with the con-
straints for their consistency, we would again end up in cir-
cularity. We believe that many would consider this circu-
larity an unsatisfactory answer to the “why?” in CC, and
potentially not attribute creativity to such a system.
By asking the “why?” for the prototype algorithms de-
scribed by Ventura (2016), we find that this shortcoming ap-
plies to symbolic CC in general. In CC, being intentional is
understood as having a goal or directive for action. These
goals are modelled with value functions, used in action se-
lection and the post-hoc evaluation of artefacts. There is
agreement that in human creativity, such values do not come
from the creative person alone, but from a network of hu-
man influences (cf. Bown, 2015). In symbolic CC however,
a system’s goals come exclusively from other human actors,
and do not reside in the system itself : TPF’s goals are deter-
mined by the algorithms and constraints specified by its de-
signer, and its simulated mood depends on the author of the
newspaper article it analyses. Value functions in symbolic
CC do not reflect a system’s own goals. Moreover, they typ-
ically reflect the designer’s goals in respect to a particular
artefact. The system’s purpose is determined by the purpose
of the artefacts produced (cf. Gerva´s and Leo´n, 2016). The
concept of intentionality in symbolic CC is thus very weak.
One might argue that CC software simply does not go
“deep enough”, but its symbolic nature makes it fundamen-
tally incapable of intrinsic goal-ownership. These systems
are computationalist, in that creativity is reduced to the ma-
nipulation of symbols. Computationalism is subject to a
range of classic AI problems such as the frame problem
(Wheeler, 2005, p. 179) and the symbol grounding problem
(Harnad, 1990). Searle (1980) addresses the latter in his fa-
mous Chinese Room argument, showing that syntax is not
sufficient for semantics. By translating Searle’s argument
to artefact creation, Al-Rifaie and Bishop (2015) show that
it also applies to CC. Because symbolic CC cannot ground
meaning, it also cannot give rise to goals which are mean-
ingful from the system’s own perspective.
Embodied Computational Creativity
Brooks (1991) has challenged these problems of symbolic
AI by embracing the ideas of situated and embodied cogni-
tion. In situated cognition, cognitive processes emerge from
the interaction of an organism and its world, and are thus in-
separable from action. Embodied cognition emphasises the
role of an agent’s physical body in shaping cognitive pro-
cesses. Potentially influenced by systems theories of creativ-
ity (cf. Saunders, 2012), CC has adopted the embodied and
situated approach: there is general agreement that creativity
does not occur in a vacuum: it is a situated activity, in that it
relates to a cultural, social and personal context. However,
it is also physically conditioned on an agent’s embodiment
and structured by how an agent’s morphology, sensors and
actuators shape its interaction with the world.
Embodied AI has developed into a mature framework for
modelling artificial agents, and Pfeifer, Iida, and Bongard
(2005) describe its characteristics via a list of design princi-
ples. Most importantly, they require an agent to have a value
function, telling it whether an action was good or bad. The
agent must then use these values to motivate its behaviour.
Embodied AI’s value principle thus operates one level be-
low the value function in symbolic CC, which is primarily
used in artefact evaluation to assess the success of genera-
tive routines. We can see the embodied AI principles being
adopted in CC: Hoffman and Weinberg (2010) for instance
leverage the effect of an agent’s morphology on creativity.
Their robot Marimba player Shimon improvises in real-time
to a human pianist’s performance. In contrast to symbolic
CC, music here is not understood as a sequence of notes, but
as a choreography of movements constrained by the robot’s
morphology. Embodied AI counteracts the Lovelace objec-
tion in that it demands a reduction of the designer’s influence
to foster emergent behaviour. Saunders et al. (2010) inves-
tigate the emergence of autonomous and creative behaviour
from the interaction of agents in Curious Whispers, where a
society of simple robots generate and listen to tunes.
Embodied AI practitioners such as Dreyfus (1992) claim
that the symbol grounding problem can be overcome by em-
bedding agents in a closed sensorimotor loop: an agent per-
ceives the effects of its actuators on the external environment
which, via its internal controller, lead to the next action. An
embodied agent can avoid the use of internal symbolic rep-
resentations, by using “the world as its own model” (Brooks,
1991). However, Froese and Ziemke (2009) argue that this
only solves the first part of the frame problem:
“Given a dynamically changing world, how is a non-
magical system (...) to take account of those state
changes (...) and those unchanged states in that world
that matter, while ignoring those that do not? And how
is that system to retrieve and (if necessary) to revise,
out of all the beliefs that it possesses, just those beliefs
that are relevant in some particular context of action?”
(Wheeler, 2005, p. 179, emphasis added)
They argue that being embedded in a closed sensorimo-
tor loop is not sufficient for an agent to evaluate features of
the world relative to its own purpose. Embodied AI’s value
principle is at the centre of their criticism, as it does not pre-
clude the external assignment of values. Shimon’s goals for
instance are hard-coded, allowing the system to perform a
prescribed set of interactions to support the human musician.
Once its counterpart deviates from the protocol, the system
fails to operate. Shimon does not act for its own purpose.
Intrinsic Motivation to the Rescue?
We can say that Shimon is extrinsically motivated, as its
goals, defining its behaviour, are imposed by its designers.
In contrast, agents can also be intrinsically motivated, per-
forming “an activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than
for some separable consequence” (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
This psychological definition has been complemented with
computational approaches, surveyed by Oudeyer and Ka-
plan (2008). Per definition, these approaches have to rely on
agent-internal experience alone, based on the semantic-free
relationship between sensors and actuators. Existing models
capture drives like learning progress or curiosity. Curious
Whispers uses a model of curiosity to make robots seek in-
teresting tunes. Here, interestingness is quantified by map-
ping a new tune’s novelty, relative to past experience, on a
Wundt curve (Saunders et al., 2010). The robots thus listen
to tunes which are neither too similar, nor too different to
those previously experienced. If the tunes of other agents
are not interesting enough, the robots create their own.
Formal models of intrinsic motivation ground behaviour
in an agent’s sensorimotor loop, and thus partly overcome
the criticism of embodied AI’s value function. Many mod-
els of intrinsic motivation are bio-inspired, but can we claim
that any intrinsic value function and the emerging behaviour
relates to an agent’s own purpose? Why would a certain
agent be curious and seek for new stimuli, instead of hiding
in a dark room? When does a particular motivational model
reflect the system’s intrinsic goals, not the designer’s? We
could simply assume agents to share our goals and behave
like us. However, if we accept that cognition and thus be-
haviour is shaped by our embodiment and situatedness, there
is no justification for this anthropocentric stance. The previ-
ously outlined theories are not sufficient to decide whether
an action policy, which formally qualifies as an intrinsic mo-
tivation, reflects the intrinsic goals of a given agent.
Enactive Computational Creativity
Embodied and situated cognition overcomes some short-
comings of symbolic CC, but does not account for an agent’s
own purpose, i.e. intrinsic teleology. Despite this, we ar-
gue that intentional creative agency is not an infinite regress
problem – we can resolve the circularity demonstrated in
symbolic and embodied CC by grounding an agent’s ac-
tions in a model of intrinsic motivation, based on a suitable
intrinsic value function. In their enactive AI framework,
Froese and Ziemke (2009) introduce the missing conditions
for such a value function to relate to an agent’s own goals.
However, their framework focusses on cognition in general.
We argue that enactive agents necessarily have to exhibit two
specific forms of creativity which can potentially give rise to
complex creative behaviour, and thus establish an account of
intentional creative agency. We refer to candidate principles
to realise these theoretical conditions, hence laying the foun-
dations for a model of enactive computational creativity1.
Enactive Artificial Intelligence
Froese and Ziemke identify the necessary requirements for
an intrinsic motivation to reflect an agent’s own goals, by
looking at how living beings are different from the non-
living with respect to their purpose. As mainstream biology
offers no distinction in respect to purpose, they draw on the
biosystemic foundations of enactive cognitive science.
Enactivism is a non-reductive, non-representationalist
theory of cognition which adopts the embodied and situated
paradigm, but additionally grounds cognition in practical ac-
tivity. Following O’Regan and Noe¨’s (2001) theory of sen-
sorimotor contingencies, Noe¨ (2004) stresses that what we
perceive is determined by what we do. At the core of enac-
tivism thus is the idea that individuals do not passively create
internal representations of a pre-given external world (Stew-
art, 2010); through their interaction with the environment,
agents enact, i.e. actively construct, their own world of sig-
nificance (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). Enactivism
thus roots sense-making in action. Froese and Ziemke fol-
low the autopoietic branch of enactivism which formulates
a strong life-mind continuity, and explicitly addresses inten-
tional agency and sense-making (cf. Thompson, 2004).
1With “computational”, we relate to CC as a research field, not
to computationalism. Our model uses insights from autopoietic en-
activism to guide the design and evaluation of artificial, intention-
ally creative agents. We believe that this approach is not restricted
to simulated embodied systems and robotics, but could also inform
other means of creating artificial agents, e.g. synthetic biology.
At the core of autopoietic enactivism are three theories
which root intentional agency in the living, and thus shed
light on our missing conditions. Kant argues that living sys-
tems have a “natural purpose” in that they are “both cause
and effect in themselves” (Kant, 1995, §64). He suggests
that the intrinsic goal-directedness of living beings arises
from their purpose to self-produce (cf. Weber and Varela,
2002). The biologist von Uexku¨ll translates these findings
to sense-making by arguing that living beings, through their
sensorimotor activity, construct their own, unique perspec-
tive on the world based on the requirements of their self-
production (Di Paolo, 2003). In what he refers to asUmwelt,
features of the environment are captured and assigned sig-
nificance in terms of how they affect the individuals’ self-
organisation and ongoing preservation. The bio-philosopher
Jonas finally provides us with an account of identity (Jonas,
1982, p.126). He argues that simple matter and most artifi-
cial systems exist without the need or capacity to act. Living
beings in contrast have a precarious existence, in that they
could at any time become a non-being; they have to continu-
ously interact with their environment in order to satisfy their
material and energetic requirements. Based on these theo-
retical underpinnings, Froese and Ziemke (2009) claim that
an agent’s value function must reflect the concern about its
maintenance of identity. Similarly Haselager (2007) argues
that “only systems with a self-generated identity can be said
to genuinely own and enact their own goals”.
The notion of self-production is operationalised by Mat-
urana and Varela’s (1987) concept of autopoiesis. An au-
topoietic system represents a minimal living organisation
which realises constitutive autonomy, as it physically indi-
viduates an entity from its environment, and constitutes its
identity in the domain. The concept of autopoiesis only ap-
plies to biochemical systems, and is generalised by the no-
tion of organisational closure. A system implementing or-
ganisational closure is a network of processes that generate
and sustain its identity under precarious conditions, and that
form a unity in a containing domain (Varela, 1979). The
first condition for enactive artificial agents states that intrin-
sic teleology requires constitutive autonomy:
EAI-1 (Constitutive autonomy): “the system must be
capable of generating its own systemic identity at some
level of description” (Froese and Ziemke, 2009).
This condition represents the enactive version of embod-
ied AI’s value principle, but it is strictly intrinsic in that the
agent must relate value to the maintenance of its own precar-
ious existence. However, Froese and Ziemke (2009) argue
that this alone is not sufficient to maintain an agent’s identity
over the long term: in a dynamic and uncertain environment,
an agent must be able to compensate for unexpected events.
This requires a value function to distinguish external events
more gradually relative to the agent’s organisation. Never-
theless, the concept of organisational closure per se is only
binary: a system either maintains its organisational closure
or not. Di Paolo (2005) compensates for this limitation by
presupposing the existence of a viability set, i.e., levels of
structural change that allow living beings to “sustain a cer-
tain range of perturbations [...] before they lose their au-
topoiesis” (Di Paolo, 2005). He defines adaptivity as
“a system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to regu-
late its states and its relation to the environment with
the result that, if the states are sufficiently close to the
boundary of viability,
1. Tendencies are distinguished and acted upon de-
pending on whether the states will approach or re-
cede from the boundary and, as a consequence,
2. Tendencies of the first kind are moved closer to or
transformed into tendencies of the second and so fu-
ture states are prevented from reaching the boundary
with an outward velocity”. (Di Paolo, 2005)
The necessity of adaptivity for intentional agency is cov-
ered by the second condition for enactive agents:
EAI-2 (Adaptivity): “the system must have the capac-
ity to actively regulate its ongoing sensorimotor inter-
action in relation to a viability constraint”
(Froese and Ziemke, 2009).
In summary, enactive AI complements and extends em-
bodied AI’s approach to move sense-making into the sen-
sorimotor loop, by grounding sensorimotor interaction in
an agent’s maintenance of its identity. Froese and Ziemke
(2009) claim that an intentional agent must not only be em-
bodied, but also realise constitutive autonomy and adaptivity
via its value function and action policy.
Creativity at the Edge of Being and Beyond
Two factors can be frequently observed in the attribution
of creativity to other humans: novelty and value (Paul and
Kaufmann, 2014; Jordanous and Keller, 2016). Current CC
systems lack intrinsic goal-ownership, because the disci-
pline misses an account for value from a non-human per-
spective. When researchers talk about creativity outside the
human domain, they simply drop value from the definition:
What Boden (2015) labels “biological creativity” in the con-
text of artificial life is earlier defined by Bown (2012) as
“generative creativity”: a system’s ability to create “new pat-
terns or behaviours regardless of the benefit to that system”.
Autopoietic enactivism provides us with an intrinsic ac-
count of value in any constitutively autonomous system. Al-
though autopoiesis literally means “self-creation”, we argue
that a system with organisational closure alone cannot be
assumed to exhibit novel behaviour in a non-trivial sense.
We thus distinguish autopoietic creativity in organisation-
ally closed systems from adaptive creativity in fully enac-
tive agents. We claim that an enactive AI must necessarily
exhibit adaptive creativity. The notion “adaptive creativity”
has been used loosely in creativity studies (Kirton, 1994)
and CC (Bown, 2012) before; we make it more concrete by
drawing on Di Paolo’s (2005) definition of adaptivity. While
the notion of value in human-creativity is ambiguous and re-
lates to complex concepts such as interestingness and aes-
thetics, enactive AI allows us to root it in utility alone.
Autopoietic Creativity Autopoiesis is generalised in op-
erational closure. Varela (1984) uses the notion of a “cre-
ative circle” to describe both (i) the self-organisation of an
organisationally closed system, and (ii) its self-maintenance
as an autonomous unity. We can distinguish two notions
of creativity along these stages. While we witness an au-
tonomous system emerging out of something else, e.g. a
cell out of a molecular soup, we can only apply the notion
of generative creativity. From the perspective of an external
observer, the system appears as a transient, ever-changing
artefact. At this stage, there is no perspective of the system
itself yet, and value can only be externally imposed.
However, once the system has individuated itself from the
containing domain, it establishes a unique perspective on
the world, mediated by its situatedness and embodiment. We
can now consider creativity from the system’s own perspec-
tive. From here, every change to its structure has a value, in
that it either preserves or destroys its organisation. To main-
tain its identity, a system has to engage in positively valued,
organisation-preserving operations (Jonas, 1982, p. 72). We
define autopoietic creativity as a system’s active modifica-
tion of stucture to ensure its continuous existence. A sys-
tem cannot be referred to as autopoietically creative, if these
changes are caused exclusively by external forces.
We argue that this form of creativity is very minimal,
in that the exhibited behaviour is not necessarily novel in
a non-trivial sense. To distinguish autopoiesis clearly from
adaptivity, we constrain our claim to a fictional autopoietic
system operating free from perturbations, i.e. there are no
external forces which could destroy its organisation. For
a system to maintain organisational closure, it is sufficient
to engage in a cyclic flow of material configurations. In the
absence of perturbations, novelty in the system’s change of
structure only depends on its current shape and its inter-
nal dynamics. Consequently, the range of possible changes
and thus novelty could be fully pre-specified and would be
quickly exhausted. This does not mean that an autopoietic
system could not exhibit valuable and novel behaviour; but
since this is not required by definition, we cannot assume it
to be creative in the popular sense described earlier.
Adaptive Creativity The notion of autopoietic creativity
is rather theoretical, as a physically embodied systemwill al-
ways be subject to entropic forces, either implicitly via ma-
terial and energetic dependencies on the environment, or ex-
plicitly through perturbations leading to its disorganisation.
To maintain its identity, such a system has to be adaptive.
We argue that adaptivity represents the essential mechanism
for creative behaviour in an autopoietic system.
According to Di Paolo (2005), an adaptive system does
not disintegrate in a second, but can undergo a variety of
structural changes before it looses its existence. These struc-
tural changes characterise the system’s viability set. Di Paolo
argues that an adaptive system must be able to recognise
whenever it is moving closer to its viability boundary, and
either slow this tendency down, or invert it in order to be
more robust against future perturbations. In contrast to the
earlier isolated system, the future structure of an adaptive
system is not only affected by its current shape and inter-
nal dynamics, but also by external perturbations. An adap-
tive system exhibits novel behaviour when it is either (i) re-
sponding to a familiar perturbation in a different way than
before, or when it is (ii) responding to a previously unen-
countered perturbation. This is non-trivial as in a dynamic
environment, an embodied system cannot be hard-wired to
anticipate and defend its identity successfully against any
possible perturbation; increasing the complexity of its inter-
nal dynamics comes with an increase in energetic and mate-
rial requirements, and thus counteracts viability. Any con-
stitutively autonomous and adaptive agent must be able to
respond flexibly to potentially unencountered perturbations
in novel but valuable ways. We define this as adaptive cre-
ativity and conclude that an enactive agent with intentional
agency must necessarily be adaptively creative.
Moving Away From the Edge An adaptive system must
be able to evaluate each structural change in its viability
set relative to its viability boundary. A structural change
that would move the system closer to its viability boundary
would be valued negative and vice-versa. Adaptive creativ-
ity, i.e. responding with novel and organisation-preserving
actions to potentially unencountered perturbations, allows a
system to move away from the boundary.
However, Di Paolo (2005) only requires an adaptive sys-
tem to regulate its states “in some circumstances”. While
such a system would likely stay close to its viability bound-
ary, acting consistently creative would allow it to move away
from the edge of being. We hypothesise that such aspi-
rational creative behaviour requires, but also gives rise to
more complex forms of creativity. To compensate and es-
cape viability tendencies, a system could change its be-
haviour via sensorimotor coordination, but it could also
adapt and augment is morphology, or change its environ-
ment. As Gibson has stated: “Why has man changed the
shapes and substances of his environment? To change what
it affords him. He has made more available what bene-
fits him and less pressing what injures him” (Gibson, 1986,
p. 123). Furthermore, we expect sociality to be particularly
important for sustaining viability. We hypothesise that as-
pirational adaptive creativity allows us to climb up the cre-
ativity ladder again. However, detailed theoretical work and
experimentation is subject to future work.
Operational Principles
There are many models of artificial curiosity, and we cannot
make a general claim without evaluating them individually
based on the enactive AI conditions. We believe that the
intrinsic model of curiosity in Curious Whispers (Saunders
et al., 2010) cannot give rise to intentional creative agency.
Only in the presence of a function indicating the agent’s vi-
ability relative to its current state can an agent relate its be-
haviour to the maintenance of its existence. An agent is not
constitutively autonomous, if it does not act based on how
close it is to losing its autonomy. In Curious Whispers, it is
unclear how selecting tunes which are neither too familiar
nor too novel relates to a robot’s viability.
Recently, several candidate principles were hypothesised
to realise the enactive AI conditions. In his Free Energy
Principle, Friston (2010) argues that in order to not become
disorganised, living organisms and artificial agents have to
maintain an upper bound on the entropy of their sensory
states as the average of surprise. The agent’s free energy, for-
malised as the difference between its model and the world,
constitutes a tractable upper bound on surprise. Allen and
Friston (2016) argue in the context of predictive coding that
a free energy minimising agent can be considered as enac-
tive, and that it realises constitutive autonomy and adaptiv-
ity. The Free Energy Principle evolves around action and
model optimality, but it is unclear whether it provides val-
ues for sense-making. Friston’s principle appears conceptu-
ally close to maximising predictive information (Ay et al.,
2008), i.e. the information an agent’s past states hold about
its future. A comparison of the principles is yet to be done.
Guckelsberger and Salge (2016) argue that the
information-theoretic principle of empowerment max-
imisation fulfils the enactive AI conditions. Empowerment
quantifies the efficiency of an agent’s sensorimotor loop.
Given that an agent could not counteract perturbations and
satisfy its energetic or material requirements with a dys-
functional loop, they argue that empowerment represents
a proxy to the agent’s viability, and that maintaining it
realises organisational closure. They show via simulations
that an agent which maximises empowerment in its action
policy realises adaptivity. Crucially, an empowerment max-
imising agent not only adapts sporadically, but consistently
increases its viability. We thus consider this a promis-
ing candidate to investigate whether consistent adaptive
creativity leads to more complex creative behaviour.
Implications: The Embodiment Distance
We have proposed a model of intentional creative agency
in which value is grounded in a system’s maintenance of
its precarious existence. We argue that a system’s sense-
making and thus creative behaviour is determined by its em-
bodiment, which is usually very different from ours: a physi-
cally embodied agent can have a different morphology, a dif-
ferent access to the world through its sensors and actuators,
and other energetic and material dependencies. We briefly
discuss first implications of this embodiment distance for the
perception of creativity in nature and artificial systems, as
well as for the design of human-like CC.
CC field studies (e.g. Colton and Ventura, 2014) demon-
strate that there are many systems that unbiased observers
deem creative, although these systems ultimately do not act
creatively in respect to their own goals. This is fair, as cre-
ativity is an essentially contested concept. Here, we look at
the opposite case: we argue that there are many adaptively
creative systems which perform novel and valuable actions
relative to their intrinsic values, but would not be deemed
creative. These systems root their values and thus behaviour
in their embodiment. Their artefacts, i.e. their own structure
and marks in the environment, are consequently value-laden
relative to their embodiment. Our judgement of human arte-
facts is sensitive to our human embodiment, as psychologi-
cal experiments in embodied aesthetics (Johnson, 2008) sug-
gest. When we evaluate the creativity of non-human systems
with intentional agency, we are likely to misjudge value in
their behaviour or artefacts, or hesitate to attribute any value
at all, as our embodiment distance is too large. This means
that we are likely to misjudge or even fail to acknowledge
the adaptive creativity of some systems, while agents of the
same type would value it highly. To judge the adaptive cre-
ativity of a system with creative intentional agency, we need
to take the perspective of that system, and assess its sense-
making and behaviour from there.
The embodiment distance is also relevant for the design
of intentional CC agents with human-like creativity. Drey-
fus (2007) has argued that human-like cognition in artificial
agents requires us to replicate human embodiment. While
this is not an issue if we are only interested in realising adap-
tive creativity in minimal intentional agents, Dreyfus’ claim
remains critical for reproducing human-like creativity.
Related Work
We have operationalised the previously loose notions of
agency (Bown, 2015), adaptivity (Bown, 2012) and auton-
omy (Saunders, 2012) in CC by drawing on autopoietic en-
activism. We seem to be the first to embrace this branch of
enactive cognitive science in CC; Davis et al. (2015) develop
a model of creative collaboration and co-creation based on
Noe¨’s (2004) sensorimotor enactivism; however, the senso-
rimotor branch focusses on the constitutive role of action in
perception, but misses an account of intentional agency.
The concept of autopoiesis has been used in systems the-
ories of creativity. However, it has been employed rather
metaphorically (Gornev, 1997) or to describe creativity in
society, not in individual agents (Iba, 2010). CC has adopted
the concept of autopoiesis: Bishop and Al-Rifaie (2016) im-
plemented an autopoietic model of creativity as a swarm
intelligence system, but they specify their value function
explicitly, instead of using an intrinsic account of sense-
making. Saunders (2012) investigates the role of commu-
nication for autonomy in creative agent societies, but does
not ground the behaviour of individual agents in the main-
tenance of their identity. Most importantly, none of the ap-
proaches provides an account of intrinsic teleology and re-
lates it to intentional (creative) agency.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown via case-studies that existing CC systems,
typically with a focus on human creativity, cannot provide
a satisfactory answer to why they are being creative because
they lack intrinsic goal-ownership. We have adopted the en-
active AI framework for a non-anthropocentric account of
intentional agency in minimal, embodied agents. Creativity,
as commonly perceived, seems to be maximally removed
from how simple organisms survive and cope within an ever-
changing environment. By showing that constitutively au-
tonomous and adaptive agents must necessarily perform in-
trinsically valuable and novel actions, we have grounded two
of the strongest factors in the attribution of creativity in the
essence of the living. It follows that enactive AI’s conditions
for an intrinsic value function to reflect an agent’s own goals
are also necessary for intentional creative agency. Saunders
(2012) notes that AI was missing a means to realise con-
stitutive autonomy. We have referred to operational prin-
ciples which are hypothesised to also realise adaptivity, and
thus laid the foundations for a non-anthropocentric, minimal
model of intentional creative agency.
The enactive account to sense-making highlights that we
can only assess adaptive creativity in artificial and natural
agents with intentional creative agency if we switch perspec-
tives: We have to take their embodiment into account, not
ours. However, it is still to be discussed whether this is sub-
ject to the hard problem of knowing what it is like to be
that system (Nagel, 1974), or if it is sufficient to use intro-
spection in artificial agents to learn about how the system
makes sense of its environment as basis for its behaviour.
We believe that our non-anthropocentric model can advance
progress in CC and extend the scope of the field: if our
creativity relies on our embodiment, it is necessarily sub-
ject to constraints as in other embodied agents. There might
be other forms of creativity in nature, resulting from differ-
ent constraints, which could benefit us. AI allows us to ex-
plore these in simulations even beyond the laws of the phys-
ical world. Similar to a famous endeavour in artificial life
(Shanken, 1998), we encourage looking beyond creativity in
nature, and investigate creativity as it could be.
We suggest this as a point of departure for a new research
direction in CC, addressing intentional creative agency from
the bottom up. One of the biggest challenges will be to
close the explanatory gap between the creative intentional
agency in our minimal agents and humans. As a first step,
we have hypothesised that aspirational, i.e. consistently
adaptive agents will give rise to more complex creative be-
haviour. To evaluate our model in practice, we have to ad-
dress the engineering challenge of building a physically em-
bodied agent that can counteract its precarious existence. We
agree with Saunders (2012) that more complex forms of cre-
ativity require the interaction with other agents, so extend-
ing our model to social creativity using insights from enac-
tivism is a promising next step. We also want to refine the
sense-making granularity of the current model by drawing
on biosemiotic enactivism (De Jesus, 2016). We are fasci-
nated by the following question: If embodied systems es-
tablish their own world of meaning relative to their embod-
iment, what do their creative products and processes look
like, and how do they differ from ours? We suggest starting
this investigation with minimal, intentionally creative agents
and climbing up the “creativity ladder”.
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